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ABSTRACT
As Latin America becomes an increasingly significant global
economic presence, the governance of its corporations has been more
closely scrutinized. In part due to the region’s history, many of its largest
corporations have been state-owned.1 As state-held corporations across the
region have been privatized, however, many states across the region have
been reluctant to fully relinquish control.2 This has created a system in
which many large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are partially owned by
sovereign states and partially by private investors. As a result, states are
confronted with inherent conflicts as they navigate the roles of
governmental administrator and majority shareholder.
This paper builds upon the foundational work of Curtis J. Milhaupt
and Mariana Pargendler in RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy
Channeling. In their paper, Milhaupt and Pargendler name the state’s
conflicted roles in mixed-ownership enterprises as “policy channeling.”3
*
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1. Jeremy Daniels, South America: A Close Look at Governance in State-Owned
Enterprises: Is Something Better than Nothing?, ETHICAL BOARDROOM (May 4, 2014), https
://ethicalboardroom.com/south-america-a-close-look-at-governance-in-state-owned-enter
prises-is-something-better-than-nothing/ [https://perma.cc/8QT6-CPDV] (stating that
“[w]ithin the South American region the majority of corporations are state-owned or
partially state-owned”).
2. See ALDO MUSACCHIO, EMILIO I. PINEDA AYERBE & GUSTAVO GARCÍA, INTERAMERICAN DEV. BANK, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 4 (2015), https://publications.iadb.org/en/state-owned-enterprise-refor
m-latin-america-issues-and-possible-solutions [https://perma.cc/8ZRP-74P8] (explaining
how many states are reluctant to relinquish control and allow the privatization of previously
state-owned companies).
3. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and
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Policy channeling occurs when a state retains majority ownership of a
formerly entirely state-owned enterprise and continues to use the
corporation to achieve policy aims that hurt private investors. This has
been seen across the developing world as governments pursue strategies
that reduce SOE profits and, as a result, investor returns.4 For example, in
2012 the Children’s Investment Fund Management threatened legal action
against the Indian government for allegedly artificially deflating coal prices
and “robbing the company of billions of dollars in potential revenue and
hurting shareholders.”5
As developing countries seek to attract more capital, particularly from
foreign investors, it is imperative that they address policy channeling
through improved corporate governance standards. In examining this
phenomenon in Latin America, Peru and Colombia provide two distinct
models for the management of mixed-ownership companies and the
mitigation of policy channeling. By considering and comparing the
countries’ strategies, Peru and Colombia—and Latin America more
broadly—can devise more sustainable, efficient, and beneficial paths to
economic development and SOE management. Simultaneously, they can
structure their partially state-owned enterprises such that private
stakeholders are confident that their investments will be protected.
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5. Saurabh Chaturvedi, U.K. Fund Exits Coal India, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2014), http
s://www.wsj.com/articles/childrens-investment-fund-management-sells-coal-india-stake-1
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I. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
State-owned enterprises have been a significant focus of corporate
governance scholarship in the twenty-first century. Until recently, SOEs
largely provided public services in domestic markets, historically providing
public services or commodities like electricity.6 They have, however, in
recent years become increasingly influential in international markets and
outside of their home countries.7
In an attempt to attract capital and to integrate into the global
economy, many developing countries have increasingly privatized SOEs.8
In this process, some states have chosen a more cautious privatization:
listing SOEs on capital markets while retaining a majority stake in the
corporation.9 The rationales behind state ownership and retaining a
majority stake in a partially privatized SOE are numerous, but largely the
same. Generally, states weigh social, economic, and strategic interests.10
These can include industrial policy, regional development, public goods
supply, as well as corrupt motives.11
This trend has produced a significant number of “mixed-ownership”
SOEs across the developing world.12 While mixed-ownership SOEs can
include enterprises in which a state actor has any amount of ownership, in
this paper I will focus on those in which a state has retained a majority
stake.
As mixed-ownership SOEs increase in number and influence, they
have increasingly made headlines. For example, the Brazilian statecontrolled oil company Petrobras has drawn attention in recent years not
only for allegations of high-level corruption, but also for Brazilian
politicians’ use of the company to achieve policy ends.13 Additionally,
6. OECD, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS 22 (2016), http://dx.
doi.org/10.1787/9789264262096-en [https://perma.cc/6UJX-MLY2].
7. Id.
8. Saul Estrin & Adeline Pelletier, Privatization in Developing Countries: What Are
the Lessons of Recent Experience?, 33 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 65 (2018).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed
State-Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for
Reform, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blo
g/blog/2017/04/governance-challenges-listed-state-owned-enterprises-around-world [https://
perma.cc/TQ23-76ES] (stating that the practice of state ownership and retention of a
majority stake in a partially privatized SOE has produced a significant number of mixedownership structures).
13. Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 3, at 6.
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mixed-ownership SOEs have been the subject of disputes in two of the
world’s fastest-growing emerging market countries: India14 and China.15
Among the key aspects of the study of mixed-ownership SOEs has
been the inherent conflict of interests between a state as majority owner
and private minority investors. In their paper RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling,
Propping, and Policy Channeling, Curtis J. Milhaupt and Mariana
Pargendler develop a term to describe this phenomenon: policy
channeling.16 They define it as “the state’s use of an SOE (as opposed to
regulation or taxation) to achieve a public policy or political objective.”17
As economies with large mixed-ownership SOEs like China and Brazil
become increasingly influential, analyzing policy channeling will be vital
to understanding the global economy.
Much of the corporate governance scholarship analyzing mixedownership SOEs and policy channeling has focused on China, the world’s
second largest economy.18 There is a gap in the literature, however, around
much of Latin America. Considered as a whole, Latin America is the
fourth largest economy in the world after the United States, the European
Union, and China.19 Mixed-ownership SOEs across Latin America have
also been pivotal in the region’s economic development.20
To the extent that the corporate governance of mixed-ownership SOEs

14. See James Crabtree & Sam Jones, TCI in Legal Threat Against Coal India, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/7e70ca02-6d12-11e1-ab1a-00144feab49
a [https://perma.cc/LW5W-35EK] (stating that “[i]n a letter sent to all Coal India board
members on March 12, TCI [The Children’s Investment Fund] attacked the company and its
board for ‘not acting independently of India’s government.’ It also accused the company of
‘acquiescence to interference by the Prime Minister’s Office’ on coal prices and a range of
other issues. TCI threatened unspecified legal action against board members.”).
15. See Nancy Huyghebaert & Lihong Wang, Expropriation of Minority Investors in
Chinese Listed Firms: The Role of Internal and External Corporate Governance
Mechanisms, 20 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 308 (2012) (examining the conflicts of
interest that arise from mixed-ownership structures in Chinese firms).
16. See Milhaupt & Pargendler supra note 3, at 5 (describing how states use SOEs to
advance policy objectives at the expensive of private investors).
17. Id.
18. Rob Smith, The World’s Biggest Economies in 2018, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 18,
2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/YPV5-LS6T].
19. Raúl Rivera, Puncturing the 4 Myths About Latin America, AMERICAS Q. (Spring
2011), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2427 [https://perma.cc/T6GU-D3FL].
20. See, e.g., Cecilia Rutkoski Hoff, Petrobras Still Matters for the Brazilian Economy,
PANORAMA INTERNACIONAL (2016), http://panoramainternacional.fee.tche.br/en/article/a-pet
robras-ainda-importa-para-a-economia-brasileira/ [https://perma.cc/7ZUZ-MH6Z] (stating
that “ . . . as a company partially owned by the state, Petrobras would assume a leading role
in national development.”).
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in Latin America has been discussed, Brazil is often the sole focus. Indeed,
the region’s most well-known mixed-ownership SOE, Petrobras, has
dominated recent global headlines.21 While Brazil is certainly important as
the region’s largest economy, other Latin American economies are
consistently growing and becoming more significant in the global
marketplace.22
This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing the corporate governance
of mixed-ownership SOEs in two of Latin America’s most competitive
economies: Peru and Colombia.23 Peru and Colombia are two of the largest
economies in the region24 and are among the Latin American countries that
have received the most foreign direct investment in recent years.25
Moreover, both have developed reforms addressing the specific needs of
mixed-ownership SOEs.26
This essay begins with a discussion of mixed-ownership state-owned
enterprises and policy channeling as phenomena. It then explores the
reasons for state-ownership, mixed-ownership structures, and the conflicted
interests that underlie policy channeling. In particular, it discusses the
tension between the role of a state as a political entity responsible for its
citizens’ welfare and a shareholder concerned with value creation and
downside protection. The paper goes on to discuss the state of mixed-

21. See, e.g., Julie DiMauro, Petrobras Corruption Scandal Provides Anti-Bribery
Policy Lessons, REUTERS (June 29, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-petrobr
as-bribery/petrobras-corruption-scandal-provides-anti-bribery-policy-lessons-idUSKBN19K
2A8 [https://perma.cc/J9GR-MLXM] (announcing that Petrobras had agreed to a settlement
with The Vanguard Group to end a shareholder suit that was initiated to recover losses due
to corruption).
22. Economy on a Steady Rise in Latin America and Caribbean Region ‘Despite
International Turbulence’ – UN Report, U.N. NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/
story/2018/08/1017662 [https://perma.cc/Z9QV-EBUJ].
23. Competitiveness Index in Selected Countries in Latin America in 2018, STATISTA
(Sept. 2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/787310/competitiveness-index-latin-americ
a/ [https://perma.cc/F3WC-54SW].
24. See OECD, BOARD PRACTICES AND FINANCING FOR LATIN AMERICAN STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES 13 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Board-Practices-Financing-Latin-Ame
rican-SOEs.pdf [https://perma.cc/K476-P7BB] (explaining that, although the Mexican
economy is larger than those of Colombia and Peru, almost all Mexican SOEs are fully
state-owned and none have stock listed).
25. ALICIA BÁRCENA, ANTONIO PRADO, MARIO CIMOLI & RICARDO PÉREZ, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 35 (2017), https://repositorio.ce
pal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42024/9/S1700815_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFH6-TYA5].
26. ALDO MUSACCHIO, EMILIO I. PINEDA AYERBE & GUSTAVO GARCÍA, INTERAMERICAN DEV. BANK, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 2 (2015), https://publications.iadb.org/en/state-owned-enterprise-refor
m-latin-america-issues-and-possible-solutions [https://perma.cc/8ZRP-74P8].
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ownership SOEs in Colombia, starting first with the landscape of these
entities in Colombia and later discussing the country’s strategies and
mechanisms to manage such entities. Similarly, it then analyzes the
analogous systems and strategies in Peru. Next, the piece compares
Colombia and Peru, focusing particular attention on the structure,
financing, and privatization efforts in both countries. Lastly, it concludes
by examining Peru’s and Colombia’s paths forward in continued mixedownership SOE reforms, underscoring lessons that each country could
learn from the other.
II. POLICY CHANNELING
Under many legal regimes, corporate managers’ primary duties are to
maximize corporate profits and to further shareholder interests.27 This
dynamic is complicated, however, when a nation-state is the majority
shareholder of an enterprise that also has private-sector shareholders.
Mixed-ownership state-owned enterprises are formed when a state allows
the private sector to invest in an SOE, founds a new SOE in partnership
with the private sector, or offers stock in an SOE through partial
privatization of that SOE.28 This structure necessarily pits the interests of
the state (as majority shareholder) against those of private investors (as
minority shareholders). This conflict of interest can manifest as “policy
channeling,” in which the state uses “partial ownership of an SOE to
achieve social or industrial policy objectives” that decrease pecuniary
returns on investment for private investors.29
State-owned enterprises are common in developing countries and are
often the driving force behind development efforts.30 This is particularly
true in countries that lack robust private sectors.31 Mixed-ownership SOEs,
by design, must navigate the potential for conflicted interests between the
state and private sector minority shareholders. Citizens of the majorityshareholder state are the ultimate owners of their country’s stake, and thus,
the state must consider their interests when making corporate decisions.32
27. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 736 (2005).
28. WORLD BANK GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A
TOOLKIT 244-45 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0222-5 [https://perma.cc/5L
C5-RDN3].
29. See Milhaupt & Pargendler supra note 3, at 1 (describing how the state can extract
private political benefits by engaging in policy channeling).
30. PETER J. MONTIEL, MACROECONOMICS IN EMERGING MARKETS 176 (2d ed. 2011).
31. Id.
32. Though the countries’ citizens are the ultimate stakeholders, it is important to note

1012

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:4

Notably, these SOEs must balance the “tension between the state’s dual
role as a shareholder and regulator,” the state’s right to tax, and public
policy objectives.33
Moreover, while a sovereign entity (or its representatives) may want
to maximize an SOE’s profits, it inherently has additional politically
motivated goals. To this aim, states often use SOEs to extract “political
private benefits of control” to further public policy or political objectives.34
Political private benefits of control are those non-pecuniary benefits that, in
the service of a political goal, government actors can gain from an SOE and
its resources.35 Frequently, the extraction of these benefits conflicts with
corporate managers’ desire to maximize profits, thus harming private sector
minority shareholders.36
While many different types of corporate owners extract private
benefits of control, this phenomenon—known as policy channeling—is
unique to mixed-ownership SOEs because of the state’s unique position as
a majority shareholder.37 Policy channeling is a distinct form of private
benefit extraction. States frequently use the corporate form as a political
tool for financial, political, and efficiency reasons.38 It is often used as an
alternative means to achieve aims otherwise pursued through regulation or
taxation.39 Indeed, policy channeling is popular “in part because [it] helps
shield government action from public law constraints such as mechanisms
of accountability and participation.”40 Nevertheless, when states choose to
prioritize a policy goal above a corporation’s bottom line, minority
shareholders suffer.
Many countries in Latin America participated in the widespread
privatization movement of recent decades and have continued to
denationalize SOEs through the present.41 The 1980s and 1990s saw a
global wave of SOE privatization, resulting in a large number of mixedownership SOEs.42 In doing so, different countries within the region
that corporate decision-making in this context is delegated by the citizenry to government
leaders.
33. Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2917, 2929 (2012).
34. Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 3, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 6.
41. UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
IN THE EARLY 1990S 2 (1999).
42. Pargendler, supra note 33, at 2954.
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developed an array of strategies to manage the resulting mixed-ownership
enterprises. Despite studies showing that corporate governance of mixedownership SOEs in Latin America is better than that of wholly-owned
SOEs, there is significant room for improvement.43
Since the new millennium, Colombia and Peru have increasingly
offered shares in SOEs on public stock exchanges.44 Throughout this
process, the two countries have taken different approaches to SOE
privatization and management. As Peru and Colombia continue to develop
their respective SOE strategies, both countries should draw inspiration
from one another as well as from international norms and guidelines. In
doing so, they may form more comprehensively effective regimes to ensure
the ongoing use of mixed-ownership SOEs as tools for economic
development.
III. COLOMBIAN MIXED-OWNERSHIP SOES
The Colombian government holds stakes in 119 companies, though it
has fully privatized many other SOEs since the 1990s and continues to do
so.45 SOE activity accounts for 32 percent of the country’s national GDP.46
All SOEs in Colombia have administrative and financial autonomy, as well
as independent legal personality.47 As such, they are subject to Colombian
private law and exempt from the nation’s Public Contracting Regime.48
43. MICHAEL PENFOLD, ANDRÉS ONETO & GUILLERMO RODRÍGUEZ GUZMÁN, DEV.
BANK OF LATIN AMERICA, TRANSPARENCY IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 39-40 (2015).
44. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN COLOMBIA 39-40 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1
787/9789264281134-en [https://perma.cc/H2EY-JH3Q]; see also Empresas de la
Corporación, CORPORACIÓN FONAFE, http://www.fonafe.gob.pe/empresasdelacorporacion
[https://perma.cc/Q4PF-LRV3] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) (listing the companies that
FONAFE, a state-owned holding company, holds shares in).
45. PHILIP STEVENS, IS THE OECD READY FOR COLOMBIAN MEMBERSHIP? 4 (2018), http
s://geneva-network.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/OECD-and-Colombian-accession.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BSP5-PD44].
46. Id.
47. L. 489/68, 489/85, 489/97, 29 diciembre 1998, 43.464 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Colom.); see also Hernando Otero & Enrique Gómez-Pinzón, Colombia, in LATIN
AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWS, TREATIES,
AND DISPUTES FOR INVESTORS, STATES, AND COUNSEL 149, 153 (Jonathan C. Hamilton,
Ómar E. García-Bolívar & Hernando Otero eds., 2012) (explaining the legal characteristics
of Colombian state-owned enterprises).
48. L. 1150/14, 16 julio 2007, 46.691 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Dec. 2474/51, 7
julio 2008, 47.043 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); see also OECD, OECD REVIEW OF THE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: COLOMBIA 24 (2015),
(explaining the characteristics and organization of the Colombian SOE sector).
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Nevertheless, because of state capital contributions, SOE activities are still
subject to regulation as it applies to state activities.49
Under Colombian law, SOEs are categorized as either Industrial and
Commercial State Companies (EICEs)50 or Mixed-Economy Corporations
(SEMs).51 The Colombian Constitutional Court has ruled that both EICEs
and SEMs must be authorized by statute, are subject to financial and
managerial oversight by the Comptroller’s General Office, must disclose
business information to Congress, and are bound by the Colombian organic
budget law.52 Moreover, the Court has held that any SOE director or
manager is subject to the same recusal policies as public officials.53
As defined by Law 489 of 1998, EICEs have the following
characteristics: “(a) legal personality; (b) administrative and financial
autonomy; [and] (c) independent capital, wholly constituted by public
funds, their products, or fees received for the entity’s functions or services,
and special constitutionally-authorized contributions.”54 EICEs are largely
independently run by their boards of directors and management and are free
to pursue any activity that management determines is in the company’s
interest. However, contracts that EICE management signs are subject to
the General Statute of Public Procurement.55
The same law circumscribes that SEMs are “constituted as
commercial enterprises with state support and private capital, which carry
out activities of an industrial or commercial nature in conformity with
Private Law.”56 SEMs in Colombia are public entities created under a
private company contract.57 Though the original Colombian statute
49. L. 1150/14, 16 julio 2007, 46.691 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Dec. 2474/51, 7
julio 2008, 47.043 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
50. Empresas Industriales y Comerciales del Estado; L. 489/85, 29 diciembre 1998,
43.464 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
51. Sociedades de Economía Mixta; L. 489/97, 29 diciembre 1998, 43.464 DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
52. Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 31 octubre 2007, Sentencia C–
910/07, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); see also Curtis J. Milhaupt &
Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned Enterprises Around the
World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 473,
500-02 (2017).
53. C.C., 31 octubre 2007, Sentencia C–910/07, G.C.C. (Colom.); see also, OECD,
supra note 48, at 85 n.19 (noting the jurisprudence established by Colombia’s Constitutional
Court regarding the relationship of SOEs to the executive government).
54. L. 489/85, 29 diciembre 1998, 43.464 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
55. CARLOS UMAÑA TRUJILLO, BRIGARD & URRUTIA ABOGADOS S.A, PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT: COLOMBIA (2012).
56. L. 489/97, 29 diciembre 1998, 43.464 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
57. See OECD, supra note 48, at 39 (describing characteristics of mixed-ownership
companies (SEMs)).
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creating the SEM structure mandated that an SEM have at least 50 percent
state support to qualify as such, the Constitutional Court has held that this
requirement is unenforceable.58 SEMs are not bound by the General Statute
of Public Procurement.59 However, if the state’s stake in an SEM rises
above 90 percent, that SEM will be governed under the same norms as an
EICE.60
Generally, for all Colombian SOEs, ownership rights are exercised by
individual ministries and agencies rather than a centralized body.61 Often,
multiple governmental bodies work in conjunction to run Colombia’s
SOEs.62 For example, while the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME)
makes strategic and operational decisions for Ecopetrol—Colombia’s
largest SOE—the Ministry of Finance acts as its majority shareholder.63
Though only three Colombian SOEs under the federal government’s64
control have ever been listed (Ecopetrol, ISA, and Isagen),65 they constitute
an outsized proportion of both the Colombian state’s portfolio and
Colombia’s capital market as a whole.66 In fact, Ecopetrol—which is also
Colombia’s largest company—alone forms 46.7 percent of the country’s
market capitalization.67 On average, the Colombian state has owned
approximately 80 percent of these companies, which contributed fiscal
58. C.C., 1 diciembre 1999, Sentencia C–953/99, G.C.C. (Colom.).
59. See OECD, supra note 48, at 39 (explaining the characteristics and organization of
the Colombian SOE sector).
60. L. 489/97 para. 1, 29 diciembre 1998, 43.464 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
61. WORLD BANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN LATIN
AMERICA: CURRENT TRENDS AND COUNTRY CASES 98 (2014).
62. See, e.g., id. (noting that “the SOE ownership function in Colombia is decentralized
and exercised by several government units simultaneously or sequentially”).
63. Id.
64. This paper will solely focus on SOEs owned by federal governments. La Empresa
de Telecomunicaciones de Bogotá (ETC) is currently majority-owned by the city of Bogotá,
though the city government announced last year its intent to sell its stake. Colombian
Capital to Sell ETB Shares in Mid-May, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2017, 10:47 PM), https://www.r
euters.com/article/colombia-etb/colombian-capital-to-sell-etb-shares-in-mid-may-idUSL1N
1HZ04Q [https://perma.cc/88GK-4F8A] (announcing that the city government of Bogotá
“will begin the sale of its controlling stake in [the] telecommunications company ETB for at
least 2.38 trillion pesos ($813 million) in mid-May”).
65. The three listed Colombian SOEs are Empresa de Petróleos de Colombia S.A
(Ecopetrol), Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. E.S.P. (ISA), and Isagen S.A E.S.P (Isagen).
Ecopetrol is a hydrocarbon company that primarily produces petrochemicals, ISA is
Colombia’s largest power transmission company, and Isagen “generates electricity, builds
projects, and markets energy solutions.” Isagen was spun-off from ISA in 1995. OECD,
supra note 48, at 32-35.
66. See OECD, supra note 48, at 32 (explaining the importance of the three Colombian
SOEs to the national government).
67. Id.
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revenue equal to 1.1 percent of the country’s GDP in 2015.68 Notably,
Colombia’s three listed, mixed-ownership SOEs have all been in the energy
industry.69 Ecopetrol, ISA, and Isagen were initially wholly owned by the
Colombian state and had initial public offerings in the 2000s.70
Formed in 1951 as a national oil company, Ecopetrol is the fourth
largest petrochemical company in Latin America and has interests in oil
fields throughout Colombia in addition to refinery operations.71 It also
operates ports for the import and export of petroleum and manages a
pipeline network in Colombia as an integrated oil company.72 As of
February 2018, it had a market capitalization of USD 107.93 trillion.73
Initially listed on the Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC) in November
2007, Ecopetrol also subsequently listed shares on the New York (NYSE)
and the Toronto Stock Exchanges (TSX)74 as American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs).75 Currently, the Colombian state owns 88.49 percent of
Ecopetrol, with minority shareholders (both individual and institutional)
holding 11.51 percent.76
Interconexión Eléctrica (ISA) is Colombia’s largest power
transmission company and was founded in 1967 as a 100 percent stateowned enterprise, or an EICE.77 ISA held its initial public offering on the
BVC in late 2000 in which 115 million shares were sold to 62,016
individual and institutional investors.78 The company issued a second
round of shares in 2002, issuing 120 million shares to 47,746 Colombian
68. Id.
69. See OECD, supra note 48, at 32-36.
70. Id. at 32-35.
71. ECOPETL:CB, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ECOP
ETL:CB [https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ECOPETL:CB] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
72. Id.
73. Ecopetrol S.A., THE WALL STREET J., http://quotes.wsj.com/CO/ECOPETROL [http
s://perma.cc/C5UU-MRPV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
74. Ecopetrol S.A. Informa que Aplicará para Deslistarse Voluntariamente de la Bolsa
de Valores de Toronto, ECOPETROL (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.ecopetrol.com.co/wps/port
al/es/ecopetrol-web/nuestra-empresa/sala-de-prensa/boletines-de-prensa/Boletines/Boletin
es/Ecopetrol-deslistar-voluntariamente-Bolsa-Valores-Toronto [https://perma.cc/KFM6-DZ
7B] (announcing that, in January 2016, Ecopetrol decided to remove its ADRs from the
TSX).
75. See OECD, supra note 48, at 33 (detailing Ecopetrol’s ownership structure).
76. Ownership, ECOPETROL, https://www.ecopetrol.com.co/wps/portal/web_es/ecopetro
l-web/investors/equity/ownership [https://perma.cc/627L-L2AB] (last visited Mar. 16,
2018).
77. Our Company, ISA, http://www.isa.co/en/our-company/Pages/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/SB79-HS43] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
78. Acciones para Todos, DINERO (Mar. 22, 2002), http://www.dinero.com/edicionimpresa/finanzas/articulo/acciones-para-todos/5796 [https://perma.cc/U2RM-MV7N].
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investors in a state effort to democratize the Colombian stock market and
increase the number of Colombians who own stock.79 Indeed, the
Colombian Constitution requires that “[w]hen the State sells its interest in
an enterprise, it will take measures promoting the democratization of the
ownership of its shares,” with particular attention to encouraging
ownership by workers.80 As of January 2018, the Colombian state owned
51.41 percent of ISA, with 10.17 percent owned by the public utility
service company Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM) and 38.42 percent
owned by private investors.81
Isagen was spun-off from ISA pre-IPO in April 1995 to create a
separate entity containing ISA’s power generating assets.82 In 2007, the
Colombian state instituted a “Share Divestiture Program” through which 20
percent of Isagen’s shares were listed on the BVC and issued to
approximately 70,000 private minority shareholders.83 In early 2016,
however, Colombia sold its majority stake in Isagen to a Canadian asset
manager, fully privatizing the enterprise.84 As such, Isagen is no longer
state-owned.

79. See Shares Program, ISA, http://www.isa.co/en/Investors/Pages/shares-program.as
px [https://perma.cc/82TB-B4Y7] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (explaining that ISA’s second
issuance of shares was marketed by the Colombian government as “ISA, Shares for All,” an
initiative to enable Colombians “to find an opportunity for safe investment”).
80. CONSITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art.60; see also, MARCIA W. COWARD
ET AL., CONSTITUTE PROJECT, COLOMBIA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1991 WITH AMENDMENTS
THROUGH 2005 17 (2005), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2005.pd
f [https://perma.cc/J2Z8-P4YG] (emphasizing the State’s effort to promote the
democratization of the ownership of shares).
81. Shareholders, ISA, http://www.isa.co/en/our-company/Pages/about-us/our-sharehol
ders.aspx [https://perma.cc/8MZN-WQSZ] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
82. Corporate Presentation: March 2016, ISA 3 (2018), http://www.isa.co/en/press/Do
cuments/our-company/corporate-presentation/corporatepresentation_v10junio2016_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD6E-9G6D].
83. Dec. 4482/06, 15 diciembre 2006, 46.483 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.);
EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN E.S.P., PROGRAMA DE ENAJENACIÓN DE LAS ACCIONES
QUE EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS DE MEDELLÍN E.S.P. POSEE EN ISAGEN S.A. E.S.P. 39 (2016), https:
//www.bvc.com.co/recursos/emisores/Prospectos/Acciones/Cuadernillo_Venta_ISAGENEPM_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJM8-Z2RY].
84. Oscar Medina & Christine Jenkins Tanzi, Canada’s Brookfield Buys Colombia’s
Isagen for $2 Billion, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 13, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article
s/2016-01-13/canada-s-brookfield-buys-colombia-s-isagen-stake-for-2-billion [https://perma
.cc/4C6D-5PXQ].
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IV. POLICY CHANNELING AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES IN COLOMBIA
Given that Colombia’s listed, mixed-ownership SOEs have consisted
only of energy production and management companies, policy channeling
in the country has primarily taken the form of energy subsidization.85 To
this end, the Colombian government has used all listed mixed-ownership
SOEs to subsidize gasoline, diesel, and electricity.86
The Colombian Ministry for Mining and Energy (MME) and
Regulatory Commission of Energy and Gas (CREG) regulate Colombia’s
biofuel prices.87 Since Colombia began subsidizing petroleum in 1983, it
has devised a variety of subsidization techniques.88 From 1983 to 1996, the
Colombian state paid Ecopetrol an explicit subsidy to artificially deflate
fuel prices.89 The MME subsequently reformulated the subsidies, making
them implicit subsidies whereby Ecopetrol paid them and the government
reimbursed Ecopetrol by reducing the dividends it received from the
company.90 With this subsidy structure, the MME could effectively prevent
the subsidy from appearing in the national budget as a fiscal cost, making it
more politically sustainable.91
Colombia has made halting efforts to reduce, and ultimately eliminate,
petroleum subsidies since 1998.92 The elimination of subsidies has long
been politically unpopular, particularly because the subsidies have been de
facto regressive, almost solely benefitting high- and middle-income
individuals (who hold most of the political influence in the country).93
When the Colombian state first issued Ecopetrol shares to private investors,
it again reevaluated its fuel subsidy schemes.94 Ecopetrol’s IPO coincided
with a global spike in oil prices and significant appreciation of the
85. WORLD BANK, COLOMBIA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE
(REDI): BALANCING SOCIAL AND PRODUCTIVE NEEDS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 17-23 (Vivien
Foster ed., 2004), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/315721468770067432/pdf/30
3790CO.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2F9-4KPR].
86. Id.
87. LADY A. GÓMEZ, USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., COLOMBIA: BIOFUELS ANNUAL
REPORT 2016 3 (Michael Conlon ed., 2016), https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%2
0Publications/Biofuels%20Annual_Bogota_Colombia_8-12-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TT
Y-4RE5].
88. Helena García Romero & Laura Calderón Etter, The Political Economy Of Fuel
Subsidies in Colombia 6 (OECD, Working Paper No.61, 2013).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 7.
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Colombian peso.95 Simultaneously, Colombia’s fuel subsidies grew to
untenable levels, reaching a peak of 1.6 percent of GDP in 2005.96 These
factors, combined with pressure from new private investors, led the
Colombian state to institute a program to effectively curb its policy
channeling through Ecopetrol by reducing the amount of fuel subsidies
extracted directly from Ecopetrol’s profits.97
To this effect, Colombia created the Fuel Price Stabilization Fund
(FEPC) as a self-funding mechanism that mitigates volatility in
international oil prices.98 The FEPC was conceived as a price-stabilization
fund to smooth oil prices by subsidizing the difference between export
parity price and a 60-day moving average.99 It was created with the explicit
purpose of facilitating the elimination of previous price subsidies.100
However, the FEPC proved an ineffective device to mitigate the impact of
Colombia’s subsidy-focused policy channeling.
First, its creation
presented a new form of policy channeling, as the necessary resources to
create it were taken from Ecopetrol.101 Indeed, when international oil
prices decreased in 2008, the MME kept prices high and continued to
funnel excess Ecopetrol profits into the FEPC.102 Second, due to
consistently rising international oil prices, the FEPC has been unable to
effectively carry out its mission.103 By November 2016, the FEPC had a
deficit of 5.4 billion Colombian pesos (approx. USD 1.9 million),104 up
from a deficit of USD 1.2 billion in 2011.105
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
OECD, OECD COMPANION TO THE INVENTORY OF SUPPORT MEASURES FOR FOSSIL
FUELS 2018 15 (2018).
100. Gabriel Di Bella et al., Energy Subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Stocktaking and Policy Challenges 50 (IMF, Working Paper No.15/30, 2015).
101. L. 1151/69, 25 julio 2007, 46.700 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
102. Ecopetrol S.A. Prospectus, SEC 6 (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed
gar/data/1444406/000114420409047056/v159727_424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/BK8Y-J6U
A].
103. García Romero & Etter, supra note 88, at 8.
104. Ahorro para Estabilizar Precio de Combustibles, una Olla sin Fondo, EL TIEMPO
(Nov. 9, 2016, 2:56 PM), http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/deficit-del-fondo-deestabilizacion-de-precios-de-los-combustibles-47661
[https://perma.cc/9TZK-4X5K];
Comunicado de Prensa No. 190, Contraloría General de la República (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
www.contraloria.gov.co/contraloria/sala-de-prensa/boletines-de-prensa/-/asset_publisher/Jl4
Sa8JTmjbW/content/un-deficit-que-crece-y-eventualmente-tendria-que-pagarse-con-recurso
s-del-presupuesto-general-de-la-nacion-estudio-de-la-contraloria-revela-hueco-fisc?inheritR
edirect=false [https://perma.cc/WP5M-NMW8].
105. Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 50.
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To maintain a positive balance sheet, the FEPC relies on the
assumption that global oil prices will fall below a predetermined
benchmark price at least one-half of the time.106 The fund funnels excess
profit from Ecopetrol when global prices are low and pays out subsidies to
the company when global prices are high.107 This, however, has proven an
ineffective strategy that has led to Ecopetrol sustaining the FEPC’s
finances as global oil prices continued to increase in the years following its
formation.108 To reduce the FEPC’s deficit, the Colombian state decreased
fuel subsidies from 0.4 percent of GDP in 2011 to 0.1 percent of GDP in
2013.109
Electricity subsidies in Colombia have drawn less criticism because
Colombia’s electricity market has higher private-sector participation than
the country’s petroleum sector.110 While state-owned ISA controls most of
Colombia’s electricity transmission network, the two largest private
distributors of electricity in Colombia still account for over half of the
market.111 Moreover, the country’s electrical energy production was
largely privatized after the state’s aforementioned sale of its stake in
Isagen.
Subsidies of electricity in Colombia have taken a different form
because they are progressive and seek to benefit low-income
Colombians.112 In the mid-1990s, the Colombian government created the
Solidarity Fund for Subsidies and Income Redistribution (FSSRI), similar
to the FEPC, to cover electricity subsidies to low-income users.113 Through
this fund, Colombians in low-income strata are provided discounted
electricity paid for by a 20 percent surcharge added to electricity costs for
those in the highest income brackets.114 The FSSRI has a small deficit that
is covered by federal funding, and not profits from ISA.115 Due to this
cross-subsidy structure that does not draw from ISA assets, electricity
106. García Romero & Etter, supra note 88, at 8.
107. Ecopetrol S.A. Prospectus, supra note 102, at 6.
108. Ómar G. Ahumada Rojas, Subsidiar la Gasolina le Está Pegando Más Duro a
Ecopetrol, EL TIEMPO, June 6, 2017, http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/debate-po
r-propuesta-de-liberar-precios-de-la-gasolina-96336 [https://perma.cc/2FN6-YPL4].
109. Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 50.
110. Id. at 16 n.13 (stating that “almost 90 percent of households benefit from crosssubsidization”).
111. Id. at 51.
112. Id. at 16.
113. Solidarity Fund for Subsidies and Income Redistribution – FSSRI, MINISTERIO DE
MINAS Y ENERGIA, https://www.minminas.gov.co/web/ingles/fssri (last visited Mar. 17,
2018).
114. Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 51.
115. Id.
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subsidies in Colombia have not amounted to policy channeling.116
Isagen, which was formerly state-owned, is now an entirely private
company.117 It does not receive any subsidies from the Colombian
government.118 It is, however, still required under Colombian law to
participate in a cross-subsidy program, wherein it “collects and transfers
20% of the energy consumption of industrial clients as subsidies to
residential clients in [lower socio-economic groups].”119
V. PERUVIAN MIXED-OWNERSHIP SOES
Peru’s management of SOEs follows a centralized model run by the
National Fund for the Financing of Public Sector Companies (FONAFE),120
a state-owned holding company created in 1999.121 FONAFE is a public
law legal entity organized under the Ministry of Economy and Finance; it is
tasked with regulating and fomenting Peru’s state-owned entrepreneurial
activity.122 The fund owns shares in 34 companies,123 with holdings in
energy, finance, mining, sanitation, infrastructure and transport, health,
media, logistics, and manufacturing.124
Of these companies, 12 are listed on the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL),
which are six times as many as Colombia.125 Despite being listed on the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 16.
Medina & Jenkins Tanzi, supra note 84.
ISAGEN, 2017 MANAGEMENT REPORT 98 (2017).
Id.
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 28, at 61.
Id. at 88.
Alfredo Bullard, Peru, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWS, TREATIES, AND DISPUTES FOR INVESTORS, STATES,
AND COUNSEL 485, 491 (Jonathan C. Hamilton, Ómar E. García-Bolívar & Hernando Otero
eds., 2012).
123. Empresas de la Corporación, CORPORACIÓN FONAFE, http://www.fonafe.gob.pe/p
ortal?accion=empresas&t=1&o=01&m=3[https://perma.cc/9NK7-WE7D] (last visited Mar.
17, 2018).
124. As categorized by FONAFE, the companies it owns shares in are: Adinelsa, Egasa,
Egemsa, Egesur, Electro Oriente S.A., Electro Puno S.A.A., Electro Sur Este S.A.A.,
Electro Ucayali S.A., Electronoroeste S.A., Electronorte S.A., Electroperú S.A., Electrosur
S.A., Hidrandina, San Gabán, and SEAL (Electricity); Banco Agropecuario, Banco de la
Nación, Cofide, and Mivivienda S.A. (Finance); Activos Mineros S.A.C. and Perupetro S.A.
(Hydrocarbons and Remediation); Sedapal (Santitation); Corpac S.A., Enapu S.A., Sima
Iquitos S.R.Ltda., and Sima Perú S.A. (Infrastructure and Transport); ESSALUD,
ESVICSAC, Editora Perú S.A., Enaco S.A., FAME S.A.C., SILSA, and Serpost S.A.
(Others). Id.
125. See Empresas con Valores Listados, BOLSA DE VALORES DE LIMA, http://www.bvl.c
om.pe/mercempresas.html [https://perma.cc/9N4Z-HYHG] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018)
(showing that these 12 companies are: Egesur, Electro Puno S.A.A., Electro Sur Este
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BVL, many of Peru’s listed SOEs have marginal or no private
investment.126 Moreover, some of Peru’s listed mixed-ownership SOEs
have not enabled individual private investors to purchase shares and have
only allowed for a development fund or pension fund to acquire a stake.127
Unlike Colombia, Peru also has six listed SOEs with 100 percent state
ownership:128
Electrosur,129 Electroperú, Egesur,130 San Gabán,131
132
Mivivienda, and Sedapal.133 However, 14.29 percent of Electroperú is
owned by the Peruvian state through FONAFE and 85.71 is owned by
private investors through the state-owned Consolidated Pension Reserve
Fund (FCR).134 Considering the interests of those invested in the FCR as
private investment, three Peruvian SOEs (all electricity companies) have
significant private investment: Hidrandina, Electroperú, and SEAL.135
Hidrandina was founded in 1983 as a wholly state-owned enterprise.136
It distributes and sells electricity to over 400,000 Peruvians living in the La
Libertad, Ancash, and Cajamarca regions.137 Hidrandina has tried to
S.A.A., Electroperú S.A., Electrosur S.A., Hidrandina, San Gabán, SEAL, Banco de la
Nación, Cofide, Mivivienda S.A., and Sedapal); El Banco de la Nación, a state-owned bank,
has listed bonds but not stock on the Lima Stock Exchange. As such, it is governed by
Peruvian public law and is excluded from this analysis. Banco de la Nación (Peru) Makes
its First Bond Placement, LEADERS LEAGUE (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.leadersleague.com/e
n/news/banco-de-la-nacion-peru-makes-its-first-bond-placement [https://perma.cc/6LY5-DS
RD].
126. See, e.g., ELECTRO PUNO, MEMORIA ANUAL 2016 9 (2016)(displaying how the
private investment in the company Electro Puno S.A.A. constitutes a mere 0.39 percent); see
also ELECTRO SUR ESTE, MEMORIA ANUAL 2016 12 (2016)(showing how the private
investment holdings in the company Electro Sur Este are only 0.36 percent).
127. See, e.g., COPORACIÓN FINANCIERA DE DESARROLLO S.A. (COFIDE), EVALUACIÓN
PRESUPUESTAL Y FINANCIERA – AL IV TRIMESTRE 2017 1 (2017).
128. RICHARD FREDERICK, OECD, THE GOVERNANCE OF MIXED-OWNERSHIP
ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: DISCUSSION PAPER 5 (Daniel Blume ed., 2012).
129. ELECTROSUR S.A., MEMORIA ANUAL PROYECTO 2016 12 (2016).
130. EGESUR: EMPRESA DE GENERACIÓN ELÉCRICA DEL SUR S.A., MEMORIA
INSTITUCIONAL 2016 11 (2016).
131. EMPRESA DE GENERACIÓN ELÉCTRICA SAN GABÁN S.A., MEMORIA ANUAL 2016 6
(2016).
132. FONDO MIVIVIENDA, EVALUACIÓN PRESUPUESTAL Y FINANCIERA: MES DE ENERO
2018 1 (2018).
133. SEDAPAL, EVALUACIÓN PRESUPUESTAL Y FINANCIERA: MES DE ENERO 2018 1
(2018).
134. ELECTROPERÚ, MEMORIA ANUAL AÑO 2016 5 (2016).
135. Id.; HIDRANDINA, PROYECTO MEMORIA ANUAL 2016 7 (2016); SOCIEDAD ELÉCTRICA
DEL SUR OESTE S.A. (SEAL), EVALUACIÓN PRESUPUESTAL Y FINANCIERA – AL IV TRIMESTRE
2017 1 (2017).
136. Nosotros, HIDRANDINA, http://www.distriluz.com.pe/hidrandina/index.php/nosotros
[https://perma.cc/7GPP-XQH3] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
137. Id.
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privatize, albeit unsuccessfully, since 1998 when it was listed on the Lima
Stock Exchange (BVL).138 In 1998, the Peruvian State sold a 30 percent
stake in the company to a private investment company.139 The company,
however, failed to raise sufficient funding for the acquisition and ultimately
negotiated a deal with FONAFE to return its stake in 2001.140 Currently,
Hidrandina is 95.18 percent owned by FONAFE and 4.82 percent owned
by private investors.141 All current private investors own a class of shares
originally issued in 1998, which then represented 5.3 percent of the
company’s capital.142
Founded in 1905 as an entirely state-owned entity, SEAL (Sociedad
Eléctrica del Sur Oeste S.A.) engages in activities related to the public
provision of electricity in Peru’s Arequipa region.143 The company
principally distributes and sells electrical energy while also generating
electricity in remote areas of the region.144 SEAL was initially listed on the
BVL in 2003.145 88.72 percent of SEAL belongs to FONAFE and 11.28
percent is held by private investors.146 Of the 11.28 percent of the company
held by minority shareholders, 3.61 percent is held by those who own less
than 1 percent of the company, and 7.67 percent is held by those owning
between 1 and 5 percent.147
Considering stakeholders in the Peruvian Consolidated Pension Fund
(FCR) as private, minority shareholders, Electroperú has, by far, the
highest private investment rate of any mixed-ownership SOE in Peru
(85.71 percent).148 The FCR is an institutional investor that manages a
portfolio on behalf of its participants.149 By its investment policies, the
138. HIDRANDINA S.A., NOTAS A LOS ESTADOS FINANCIEROS AL 30 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE
2012 1 (2012); Peru’s Privatization Plan Falters, Misses $500 Million Target by Half,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1010094973885126840 [https://
perma.cc/S2TY-VLMT].
139. HIDRANDINA, supra note 136.
140. Hidrandina, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIT, http://www.psiru.or
g/companies/hidrandina.html [https://perma.cc/6W9R-EKYY] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
141. HIDRANDINA, supra note 136.
142. Id.
143. SEAL, CORPORACIÓN FONAFE, https://www.fonafe.gob.pe/empresasdelacorporacio
n/seal [https://perma.cc/FLC9-VFMM] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
144. Id.
145. Sociedad Eléctrica del Sur Oeste S.A. (SEAL), BOLSA DE VALORES DE LIMA, http:
//www.bvl.com.pe/inf_corporativa70355_U0VBTERDMQ.html [https://perma.cc/S4YT-2
WDL] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
146. SOCIEDAD ELÉCTRICA DEL SUR OESTE S.A. (SEAL), supra note 135.
147. BOLSA DE VALORES DE LIMA, supra note 145.
148. Although the FCR owns 85.71 percent of Electroperú, FCR’s shares in the company
are managed by FONAFE. See ELECTROPERÚ, infra note 152.
149. Política de Inversión Financiera del FCR 2017 4 (2017), https://www.onp.gob.pe/se
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FCR is obligated to provide its participants a rate of return higher than the
prevailing interest rate, which was 5.03 percent as of 2017.150 To this aim,
the fund’s primary goals are (1) growth; (2) ensuring financing of the
pension system; (3) capital protection; (4) security; and (5) transparency.151
This growth requirement, and these goals, present significant risk of policy
channeling as they come into conflict with policy aims of the Peruvian
state.
Electroperú’s primary business objective is to generate, transmit, and
sell the electricity produced by its hydroelectric and thermal power
plants.152 The company was created by statute in 1972 as an entirely stateowned operation subject to public law.153 In 1981, its legal status was
converted to a state-owned company subject to private law.154 Since
September 2006, 10 percent of Electroperú’s shares have been listed on the
Lima Stock Exchange, all of which are currently owned by the FCR, a
state-owned pension fund.155
Electroperú’s private investors own shares of the company through the
FCR, whose Electroperú shares are managed by FONAFE.156 FONAFE
retains 100 percent of the voting rights.157 As such, minority shareholders
have very limited rights within the corporation. Despite this ownership
structure, the threat of policy channeling remains because FONAFE has
greater incentives to pursue policy-oriented objectives, and the FCR aims
to maximize its shareholders’ returns.
VI. POLICY CHANNELING AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES IN PERU
Given Peru’s centralized model for SOE management, Peru’s efforts
to mitigate policy channeling are largely conducted through FONAFE.158
ccion/centro_de_documentos_PTE/DocumentosFCR/Pol%C3%ADtica%20de%20Inversi%
C3%B3n%20Financiera%20del%20FCR%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH6K-4SS].
150. Id. at 19.
151. Id. at 9.
152. ¿Quiénes Somos?, ELECTROPERÚ, http://www.electroperu.com.pe/ElectroWebPubl
ica/PaginaExterna.aspx?id=1&modo=submenu&idioma=ESPANOL [https://perma.cc/E3E
A-Y7EX] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
153. Nuestra Historia, ELECTROPERÚ, http://www.electroperu.com.pe/ElectroWebPublic
a/PaginaExterna.aspx?id=8&modo=submenu&idioma=ESPANOL [https://perma.cc/L7EJCY2L] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
154. Id.; Dec. 41, 4 Mar. 1981 (Peru) (stating that the reason for this conversion was to
allow Electroperú to act more quickly and with more independence).
155. ELECTROPERÚ, supra note 134, at 5.
156. Id. at 33.
157. FREDERICK, supra note 128.
158. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 28, at 62.
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FONAFE has established the Framework Code of Good Corporate
Governance of SOEs, which requires each SOE to formulate its own
governance standards based on FONAFE’s structure.159 It also has broad
authority to manage companies within its portfolio.160 For example,
FONAFE appoints all board members for its majority-owned companies,161
approves their consolidated budgets, and manages their resources as a right
stemming from majority ownership.162
Similar to Colombia, the three Peruvian listed SOEs with meaningful
private investment are all within the energy sector. As such, the risk of
policy channeling is in the form of energy subsidies. SOEs contribute a
significant proportion of Peru’s electricity, with Electroperú generating
20.7 percent, Hidrandina distributing 11.49 percent, and SEAL distributing
5.77 percent in 2016.163 Like Colombia, Peru has a cross-subsidy program
for electricity, which is run through the Electricity Social Compensation
Fund (FOSE).164 The FOSE was created in 2001 through Law No.
27510,165 establishing a program through which users consuming less than
100 kWh per month receive discounted rates subsidized by higher rates
paid by users of more than 100 kWh.166
Since its creation, the FOSE has been expanded to benefit more
Peruvians, with particular attention to those living in rural areas.167
Additionally, the FOSE encourages private investment in electricity by
providing subsidies to cover certain equipment and operational costs for
those investing in rural electrification.168
FOSE is financed entirely through regularly updated surcharges paid
by large electricity users based on a percentage of their sales projections.169
As such, it does not represent any net cost to the Peruvian state or to
Peruvian SOEs and the interests of private investors in Peruvian mixed159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 28, at 173.
WORLD BANK, supra note 61, at 114.
MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, CAPÍTULO 9: PARTICIPACIÓN DE LAS EMPRESAS
ESTATALES Y PRIVADAS EN EL MERCADO ELÉCTRICO 3-7 (2016).
164. IBP, INC., PERU: ENERGY POLICY, LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK, VOLUME 1:
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND BASIC LAWS 63 (2015).
165. L. 27510, 28 agosto 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [D.O.] (Peru).
166. IBP, INC., supra note 164.
167. L. 28307, 28 julio 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [D.O.] (Peru); L. 30319, 22
abril 2015, DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [D.O.] (Peru).
168. WORLD BANK GROUP, THE ELECTRICAL SOCIAL COMPENSATION FUND (FOSE) –
PERU, https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/electrical-social-compen
sation-fund-fose-peru [https://perma.cc/MAC6-MM78] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
169. L. 27510, supra note 165, art.2.
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ownership SOEs are not harmed.170
VII. COMPARISONS: STRUCTURE, FINANCES, AND PRIVATIZATION
EFFORTS

Colombia and Peru diverge in their management of listed SOEs and
policy channeling along three primary axes: management centralization, the
financial structure of energy subsidies, and tolerance for private minority
involvement in SOEs.
Colombia manages its SOEs through a largely decentralized model in
which sectoral ministries (notably the Ministry for Mining and Energy)
Notwithstanding such ministry
exercise the most influence.171
involvement, Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP) oversees
the physical operations of the country’s SOEs. The DNP evaluates all SOE
investments that involve federal money, maintains SOE financial records,
and monitors SOE performance.172 Colombian SOEs are free to develop
their own financial and performance objectives, though these objectives
must align with the country’s National Development Plan.173 However,
because this plan provides very broad guidelines, SOEs are largely able to
establish their own corporate strategies with little governmental
interference.174
In contrast, Peru’s SOE management is highly centralized around the
FONAFE.175 FONAFE retains tight control over many aspects of the
governance of Peruvian SOEs, including mixed-ownership companies.
Though the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has noted a trend among its members to increasingly centralize
SOE management, it “accepts that there is no particular ownership structure
that fits the needs of all countries.”176
Policy channeling in Colombia, and the potential for the practice in
Peru, primarily takes the form of energy subsidization: in Colombia this
encompasses gas, diesel, and electricity subsidies while in Peru it is limited
to electricity subsidies.177 As such, electricity subsidies in both countries
170. Id.
171. DANIEL BLUME, OECD, OWNERSHIP OVERSIGHT AND BOARD PRACTICES FOR LATIN
AMERICAN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 3 (2012).
172. WORLD BANK, supra note 61, at 98.
173. Id. at 99.
174. Id.
175. BLUME, supra note 171.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Peruvian state-owned petroleum companies do not have meaningful private
investment. WORLD BANK, supra note 85, at 17-23; WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 168.
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largely benefit low-income populations. They are relatively simple to
administer and are given to residents based on the average income of the
region in which they live (Colombia)178 or their level of electricity usage
(Peru).179 Moreover, because both countries have structured electricity
subsidies as cross-subsidies paid for by consumers that are either wealthier
or consume more electricity, they do not amount to significant policy
channeling.180 It is noteworthy, however, that Peru has structured its
electricity subsidies to be fully self-sustaining whereas Colombia’s subsidy
program runs a small deficit and relies on federal funding.181
Given the greater amount of capital needed to sustain them,
Colombia’s gas and diesel subsidies present a more significant issue; this is
despite reforms to fund them, at least superficially, through the FEPC and
not directly from Ecopetrol profits.182 However, in a recent statement, the
Deputy Comptroller of the Ministry of Mines and Energy stated that, in
practice, Ecopetrol continues to sustain the FEPC’s finances through a
separate account from which the government withdraws funds.183 It
appears then, at least in part, that Colombia’s efforts to mitigate this policy
channeling are mere window dressing.
Colombia has also shown a higher tolerance for private involvement
in its SOEs than Peru, and Colombian mixed-ownership SOEs provide
more equitable treatment to minority shareholders than those in Peru.184 As
Colombia has sought to attract private investment, it has publicly
demonstrated its commitment to minority shareholder protection.185 For
example, in 2007 Ecopetrol issued a “Declaration of the Nation in its
Capacity as Majority Shareholder” to concretize its protection of minority
shareholders with regards to dividends, decision-making processes, and
information access.186 The company also has bylaws which allow minority
shareholders to participate and vote in the Shareholders General Meeting,
receive dividends, have timely access to the company’s public information,
request calls for extraordinary meetings, and ask for authorization to carry

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 51.
L. 27510, supra note 165.
Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 50; IBP, INC., supra note 164, at 63.
Di Bella et al., supra note 100, at 51.
MARÍA CATALINA ESCOBAR, ECOPETROL S.A., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 54 (2015).
183. Ahumada Rojas, supra note 108.
184. See PENFOLD, ONETO & RODRÍGUEZ GUZMÁN, supra note 43, at 55-58 (scoring
SOEs as follows: Ecopetrol: 10; ISA: 10; Isagen: 10; Electroperú: 5).
185. OECD, supra note 48, at 60.
186. MAURICIO CÁRDENAS SANTAMARÍA, ECOPETROL, DECLARACIÓN DE LA NACIÓN EN SU
CALIDAD DE ACCIONISTA MAYORITARIO DE ECOPOETROL S.A. (2018).
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out specialized audits and to prepare proposals related to the company’s
good corporate governance.187
Similarly, Peru has administrative laws that require State-owned
Enterprises with minority shareholder participation to establish internal
policies to ensure the fair treatment of shareholders, particularly regarding
voting rights and access to company information.188 Additionally,
FONAFE has an internal policy outlining the rights of minority
shareholders in its companies, which are limited.189 However, these
protections are weaker than those that Colombia provides and do not apply
to private investments through pension funds like the FCR.190
Though Peru has more listed SOEs than Colombia, the majority of
Peru’s listed SOEs are 100 percent state-owned versus the mixedownership structure more commonly seen in Colombia.191 Moreover, of
Peru’s few mixed-ownership SOEs, the majority have insignificant private
ownership.192 For the handful of listed mixed-ownership SOEs having
significant private stakeholders, the Peruvian state has retained the majority
of shareholder rights and has been reluctant to allow minority shareholders
voting rights, limiting them by allowing private investment through
pension funds.193 In contrast, Colombia has actively pursued the issuance
of SOE shares to private investors, including successfully listing securities
on stock exchanges in the United States, Canada, and Germany—all the
while taking steps to protect minority shareholder rights (or give the
appearance thereof).194
187. Bylaws of Ecopetrol S.A., art.10, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1444406/000114420418021353/tv489450_ex1-1.htm [https://perma.cc/
32BH-59QC].
188. WORLD BANK, supra note 61, at 24.
189. See Santiago Chaher, OECD, BOARD PRACTICES AND FINANCING FOR LATIN
AMERICAN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 33 (Daniel Blume ed., 2015) (stating that “minority
shareholders are consulted about recapitalization decisions”); see also WORLD BANK GROUP,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A TOOLKIT 173 (2014) (stating
that “Peru’s FONAFE . . . appoints all board members for companies in its portfolio”).
190. See FREDERICK, supra note 128, at 5 (discussing how 78% of Electro Peru is owned
by a pension fund, but the state still retains 100% of the voting rights).
191. See CORPORACIÓN FONAFE, supra note 123 (describing the Peruvian Companies
that are state-owned).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., FREDERICK, supra note 128 (noting, for example, that 78% of Electroperú
is owned through the state-owned pension scheme and that this constitutes all of the
company’s private ownership).
194. ECHA:GR (ECOPETROL SA), BLOOMBERG MARKETS, https://www.bloomberg.com/q
uote/ECHA:GR [https://perma.cc/Z66V-R2BN] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) (displaying
Ecopetrol’s share price on a German stock exchange); see also Ecopetrol S.A. (EC),
YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/Ec?ltr=1 [https://perma.cc/2P57-VPD5]
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VIII. REASONS FOR REFORM
As Peru and Colombia seek to expand their economies, both nations
should prioritize the reform of mixed-ownership SOEs and the mitigation
of policy channeling. Within Latin America, Peru and Colombia (along
with Brazil) are leaders in reporting the best overall SOE corporate
governance practices.195 Both countries, however, should adjust their
corporate governance strategies to best protect minority shareholders in
mixed-ownership SOEs and thereby encourage investment.
Corporate governance is a critical factor in emerging market
investment decisions, and good corporate governance is key to attracting
foreign capital.196 A recent International Finance Corporation survey found
that——out of 29 respondent emerging market investment firms——all
reported that “governance was part of their pre-investment due diligence on
a target firm.”197 Additionally, the survey highlighted that emerging
markets investors believe that, in countries where corporate governance
standards are relatively weak, strong firm-level governance can make up
the difference.198 Most importantly, the survey found that investors are
willing to pay a premium to invest in emerging market firms with better
corporate governance.199 To this aim, as Peru and Colombia look to inject
more private capital into SOEs, governance improvements must take
precedence.
In addition, improving corporate governance regimes may grant
countries access to multinational organizations that provide an array of
political and economic benefits. Notably, both Peru and Colombia have
cited a desire to accede to the OECD as a driving force behind some
corporate governance reforms.200
(last visited Mar. 17, 2018) (showing Ecopetrol’s share price on the NYSE); see also
Ecopetrol S.A. informa que Aplicará para Deslistarse Voluntariamente de la Bolsa de
Valores de Toronto, supra note 74 (protecting minority shareholders’ rights while efficiently
clearing shares issued and sold).
195. See PENFOLD, ONETO & RODRÍGUEZ GUZMÁN, supra note 43, at 37 (discussing
reporting practices and trends among SOEs).
196. VIKRAMADITYA KHANNA & ROMAN ZYLA, SURVEY SAYS . . . CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE MATTERS TO INVESTORS IN EMERGING MARKET COMPANIES 1 (2017).
197. Id. at 6.
198. Id. at 9.
199. Id. at 6 (noting that “more than half of the investors surveyed said that they would
be willing to pay at least 10 percent more for a better-governed firm, compared to a similar
firm in the same emerging market that lacks strong governance. While 38 percent responded
that they would pay at least 20 percent more for shares in such a company, some few
suggested that would pay even more—closer to a 40 percent premium.”)
200. Ulric Rindebro, Peru Eyes OECD Corporate Governance Standards, BNAMERICAS
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With membership in an organization like the OECD comes economic,
reputational, and political benefits. In anticipating benefits that Colombia
and Peru may receive after being offered OECD membership, it is helpful
to assess the experiences of the only other two current Latin American
OECD members: Mexico and Chile.201 Mexico joined the OECD in 1994
and Chile became a member in 2010.202 After joining the organization,
both Mexico and Chile received a significant increase in foreign direct
investment.203 Additionally, both countries showed an improved investor
perception as measured by interest rates on their respective sovereign
debt.204
Apart from the resultant benefits of OECD membership, the accession
process itself provides benefits. First, it provides countries the opportunity
for close inspection from a third party, aiding them in charting
development and reform pathways.205 Second, it provides politicians with
domestic political cover for pushing reforms.206 Third, the accession
process cements a political commitment to OECD values, which promotes

(Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/banking/peru-eyes-oecd-corporate-go
vernance-standards [https://perma.cc/XMD9-ZSUT] (emphasizing that “Peru wants to learn
from OECD’s corporate governance expertise with the aim of incorporating such standards
into local regulations and rais[ing] its standing in the international investor community”);
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN COLOMBIA 3-4 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789
264281134-en [https://perma.cc/5LC5-RDN3].
201. See OECD Strengthens Engagement with Partner Countries During Annual
Ministerial Meeting, OECD (June 1, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/oecd-st
rengthens-engagement-with-partner-countries-during-annual-ministerial-meeting.htm [https:
//perma.cc/P8PN-RVQR] (noting that Mexico and Chile are the only two member countries
from Latin America at present, but Colombia has been invited to join, membership talks
with Costa Rica are ongoing, and Argentina, Brazil, and Peru have all submitted
membership requests).
202. Colombia’s Accession to the OECD: Expected Benefits in Light of the Mexican and
Chilean Experiences, SEEKING ALPHA (Jul. 26, 2016), https://seekingalpha.com/article/3991
674-colombias-accession-oecd-expected-benefits-light-mexican-chileanexperiences?page=2
[https://perma.cc/6LFH-F8U5].
203. See id. (noting that while there is correlation between a country’s accession to the
OECD and an increase in foreign direct investment, causation has not been proven; Mexico
joined OECD in the same year that it became a member of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and Chile experienced a commodity boom in the same year it joined
the OECD).
204. See id. (stating that “[f]or Mexico, we observe a sustained decrease before and after
induction, interrupted by a spike which can be attributed to the 1994 economic collapse. In
the case of Chile, again we observe a decrease in average interest rates interrupted by a
spike corresponding to the 2008 global crisis.”).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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a country’s reputation among international emerging market investors.207
There is also significant prestige linked to “[b]ecoming a member of the socalled rich countries’ club.”208 Given Colombia and Peru’s historic
political and economic volatility, this commitment to the OECD, domestic
actors, and the global economic community is particularly impactful.
After years of discussion and reform, Colombia was invited to join the
OECD in May 2018.209
The nation will officially become the
organization’s newest member once its parliament ratifies the OECD entry
instruments and formally delivers them to the national government.210
Notably, in the OECD’s announcement of this membership invitation, it
underscored “major reforms . . . [of the] corporate governance of stateowned enterprises” as a critical component of the accession process.211
While not as far along in the process, Peru has also engaged with the
OECD in an OECD Country Program to institute reforms necessary to
begin accession talks.212 Notably, the OECD recognizes that “SOEs are
generally under state ownership at least in part to address public policy
objectives.”213 To curb the impact of this policy channeling, the OECD
recommends that SOEs provide adequate disclosure to private investors as
well as regular reports on stakeholder relations with special attention to
labor, creditors, and other affected communities.214
207. Id.
208. Gabriela Lecaro Calle, The Question of Latin America and OECD Membership,
GLOBAL RISK INSIGHTS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://globalriskinsights.com/2016/08/oecd-membe
rship-question-not/ [https://perma.cc/J569-6ND5].
209. OECD Countries Agree to Invite Colombia as 37th Member, OECD (May 25,
2018), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-countries-agree-to-invite-colombia-as-37th-me
mber.htm [https://perma.cc/37TG-KZJ6].
210. Colombia’s Santos Signs OECD Entry Document, AGENCIA EFE (May 30, 2018), ht
tps://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/colombia-s-santos-signs-oecd-entry-document/500002
62-3633039 [https://perma.cc/CZ4M-ECQL.
211. See supra note 209 (stating that “[a]s part of its accession process, Colombia has
been subject to in-depth reviews by 23 OECD Committees and has introduced major
reforms to align its legislation, policies and practices to OECD standards, including on
labour issues, the reform of its justice system, corporate governance of state-owned
enterprises, anti-bribery, trade as well as new national policies on industrial chemicals
policy and waste management.”).
212. A Mutually Beneficial Relationship, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/latin-america/cou
ntries/peru/ [https://perma.cc/R6B8-JJR5] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018); see also Alonso
Morán de Romaña, Productivity Provides the Key to Peru’s Bid for OECD Membership,
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
CENTRE (Jan. 25, 2018), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/01/25/productivity-provi
des-the-key-to-perus-bid-for-oecd-membership/ [https://perma.cc/6LYP-UKBM](discussing
the challenges that Peru must overcome to be admitted to the OECD).
213. BLUME, supra nota 171, at 13.
214. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED
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IX. PROPOSED REFORMS ON THE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT
As Peru and Colombia devise strategies to limit policy channeling and
reform the corporate governance of their respective mixed-ownership
SOEs, they must look both to international guidelines and to each other as
examples.
To guide emerging markets as they devise and reform corporate
governance standards, the OECD issued Guidelines on the Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (“Guidelines”) in 2015.215 The
Guidelines provide a broad set of “recommendations to governments on
how to ensure that SOEs operate efficiently, transparently and in an
accountable manner.”216 Section IV of the Guidelines, “Equitable treatment
of shareholders and other investors”, is particularly well-suited to address
the issues stemming from policy channeling in Peru and Colombia.217
As an overarching principle, Section IV of the Guidelines
recommends that governments “ensure that all shareholders are treated
equitably,” proposing a high degree of transparency and communication
with minority shareholders.218 Furthermore, the Guidelines advise allowing
minority shareholders to participate in corporate decisions and emphasize
that “[w]here SOEs are required to pursue public policy objectives,
adequate information about these should be available to non-state
shareholders at all times.”219
In this endeavor, Colombia has succeeded more than Peru. Indeed, in
a 2015 study by the Development Bank of Latin America, Ecopetrol, ISA,
and Isagen all received perfect marks for the equitable treatment of
minority shareholders, while no Peruvian SOE scored above 5 (of 10).220
Additionally (and perhaps because of this), Colombia has been more
successful than Peru in attracting private investment in its SOEs.221 To
attract more private investment in its SOEs, Peru should guarantee minority
ENTERPRISES 23 (2015).
215. Id. at 11 (stating that “[t]he Guidelines aim to: (i) professionalise the state as an
owner; (ii) make SOEs operate with similar efficiency, transparency and accountability as
good practice private enterprises; and (iii) ensure that competition between SOEs and
private enterprises, where such occurs, is conducted on a level playing field”).
216. Id. at 7.
217. Id. at 22.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See PENFOLD, ONETO & RODRÍGUEZ GUZMÁN, supra note 43, at 55-58 (comparing
SOEs across different countries and industries).
221. See, e.g., Our Shareholders, ISA, http://www.isa.co/en/our-company/Pages/about-u
s/our-shareholders.aspx [https://perma.cc/CM4X-7Y6B] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018)
(discussing the ownership structure of ISA).
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shareholders more rights. For example, FONAFE currently retains the
right to appoint all board members for companies in its portfolio.222 It has
also been reluctant to issue significant numbers of shares on stock
exchanges or allow shares in its SOEs to be freely traded. By maintaining
tight control of its SOEs, and thus limiting incoming private investment,
Peru limits its ability to develop economically.
Simultaneously, however, to protect and attract minority investments
Colombia should make the politically difficult decision to allow petroleum
prices to vary more according to market conditions. Moreover, Colombia
should ensure that any subsidy program it institutes is self-sustaining and
financially separate from SOE revenue. Doing so would allow it to curb, or
eliminate, policy channeling through Ecopetrol and attract additional
funding from private investors.
As Peru and Colombia continue to privatize their respective SOEs,
both countries look to the OECD for direction. They should, additionally,
look to each other and adopt specific practices that have proven effective in
minimizing policy channeling and attracting private investment.
Though both Peru and Colombia are regional leaders in the corporate
governance of SOEs, both countries have additional steps ahead of them to
continue to grow economically and attract private investment. By entirely
separating the state’s ownership function from its public policy objectives
and providing minority shareholders with protected rights, both countries
can further utilize mixed-ownership SOEs to drive growth.

222. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 28, at 173.

